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Abstract
Animal welfare issues may involve different species and require decision-makers to compare welfare 
across species. Up to now applied ethologists have largely ignored questions involving cross-species 
comparisons. This paper discusses the question whether cross-species comparisons about animal wel-
fare can be provided with a scientific basis, i.e., based on scientific arguments. The arguments pro and 
contra are reviewed. Conceptually, cross-species comparisons should be possible, but at the explanatory 
and operational levels substantial problems remain to be resolved. An example is given comparing the 
welfare of laying hens in battery cages, conventionally housed fattening pigs, conventionally housed 
broilers and dairy cattle at pasture. Possibly a method could be developed that makes welfare assess-
ments across species more transparent and coherent, and that is based on available scientific informa-
tion. An outline of such a method is described in this paper.
Additional keywords: farm animal welfare assessment, livestock production, housing systems
Introduction
Animal welfare is a persistent issue in many modern-day societies. To help resolve 
questions as to what really matters to animals, applied ethologists have been study-
ing the behaviour, stress physiology and pathophysiology of different species of farm 
animals under a wide range of conditions. Over the years much scientific knowledge 
about animal welfare has been generated (summarized in various reports and books, 
e.g. Fraser & Broom 1990; Anon., 1997), even though much remains to be debated 
(e.g. Kennedy, 1992; Rushen & De Passillé 1992; Stafleu et al., 1996; Bracke et al., 
1999a). Despite this ‘uncertainty’, it is commonly agreed amongst researchers in this 
field that, at least within species, applied ethologists can compare the different welfare 
states of animals in different housing systems (Anon., 2001a; Bracke et al., 2002a, b; 
Rushen, 2003).
 Policy makers and consumers, however, must make decisions about animal wel-
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fare involving cross-species comparisons (CSCs). At the political level CSC issues are 
becoming increasingly evident. For example, animal welfare legislation is often formu-
lated in species-specific rules, and it may be questioned why in Europe, for example, 
calves but not piglets may be taken from their mothers immediately after birth. In 
addition, a decision on banning mink farming may have to face the question as to 
whether minks are worse off than, for example, hens in cages. CSCs are not only rele-
vant for political decision-making, also individual consumers may have to make CSCs, 
e.g. when they decide which animal products they find (ethically) acceptable. If policy 
makers or consumers are faced with factual questions concerning CSC they may turn 
to scientists for an answer. Scientists have a common (biological) conceptual frame-
work for welfare assessment and could perhaps answer questions about CSC as purely 
descriptive questions about what is factually the case with respect to the animals’ wel-
fare states. Up to now, however, applied ethologists have largely ignored these ques-
tions, possibly because scientists may believe that CSC is beyond their capabilities.
 In this paper it is presumed that animals actually have a welfare state that can be 
assessed by scientists using behavioural and physiological measurements. Building 
upon these assumptions this paper explores if and how descriptive questions about 
cross-species comparisons of animal welfare could be answered.
Methods
I try to design a scientific approach to cross-species comparison, especially in relation 
to farm animal welfare assessment, by presenting a mixture of philosophical, ethical, 
political and scientific arguments. The arguments concerning cross-species compari-
sons (CSCs) are classified into arguments at the conceptual, explanatory and opera-
tional level (after Stafleu et al., 1996). Conceptual arguments deal with philosophical 
issues around the definition of terms and basic assumptions about metaphysics/ontol-
ogy (what is the case) and epistemology (what can be known). Explanatory arguments 
relate to the scientific (biological) framework. Operational arguments concern the 
practice of performing CSC. At each level the arguments will be presented and dis-
cussed in order to evaluate whether and how scientists could make cross-species 
comparisons.
 At the end of this paper an example will be presented to identify an outline of a 
method that could be adopted to perform CSCs. It involves a comparison of four com-
mon husbandry systems for livestock production, using a list of needs derived from 
Bracke et al., (1999b). The production systems are: (1) laying hens in battery cages, 
(2) conventionally housed fattening pigs (small groups of pigs on half-slatted concrete 
floors without straw), (3) conventionally housed broilers (very large groups on litter 
substrate), and (4) dairy cattle at pasture (with milking twice a day in a milking par-
lour). Each system is ranked and weighted ‘subjectively’, i.e., based on the author’s 
opinion, on a 4-point scale from 1 (need state probably considerably frustrated) to 
4 (need state probably satisfied). To arrive at a method to perform CSC, subjective 
judgments can be replaced progressively by scientific facts from which conclusions 
are drawn using rules of logic such as a Wilcoxon signed ranks test (Anon., 2001b) 
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to ‘test’ the hypothesis whether the systems differ in the ‘amount’ of need frustration 
and satisfaction.
Conceptual level
At the conceptual level the following arguments pro and contra CSC can be identified. 
CSC concerns the assessment of the welfare states of animals from different species, 
i.e., it involves the concepts ‘species’, ‘welfare’ and ‘assessment’. In this paper wel-
fare is defined as the quality of life as perceived by the animals, i.e., the amount of 
suffering and happiness experienced by the animals (Anon., 2001a). However, the 
arguments presented here also hold for other definitions of animal welfare, including 
definitions in terms of biological functioning (e.g. Broom, 1996).
 An assessment of the welfare state of an individual animal entails using some 
sort of scale, e.g. an ordinal scale including ‘good welfare’, ‘average welfare’ and ‘poor 
welfare’ (Broom, 1996). Such an assessment involves a reasoning process based on 
quantitative and qualitative facts and inferences leading to a conclusion where the wel-
fare state is expressed on the scale. For instance, we would like to be able to say ‘this 
animal’s welfare level is 8 on a scale from 0 to 10’ (Bracke et al., 2002a). Both, welfare 
experts and lay persons are able to give such welfare scores for various livestock pro-
duction systems (M.B.M. Bracke, unpublished data). Both groups performed this task 
without much hesitation, thereby (tentatively) suggesting that they used a common 
scale across species. This is in accordance with common sense where the metaphysi-
cal/ontological assumption is that the welfare of different species can be expressed 
on a single scale. This assumption underlies the (semantic) fact that only one word 
for ‘welfare’ is used for both humans and animals, which can also be found in certain 
pieces of legislation such as the Dutch law for the protection of laboratory animals. 
This law requires researchers to weight animal suffering against human interests and 
it also requires them to register the anticipated level of discomfort on a common scale 
for different species. From these metaphysical/ontological, psychological, linguistic 
and political perspectives questions can be raised about CSC, which are conceptually 
legitimate. 
 At the conceptual level, CSC issues also are in accordance with the scientific per-
spective. Welfare can be expressed on a (semi-)quantitative scale and a proper assess-
ment requires an interpretation of scientific facts based on scientific reasoning. Since 
welfare cannot be measured directly (yet), an assessment of animal welfare is always 
an assessment from a human’s point of view (Bekoff et al., 1992). Science can deal 
with such items, provided the underlying concepts can be defined adequately and a 
methodology can be specified to operationalize the assessment (Bracke et al., 2002a). 
An important aspect is that welfare assessment is typically a judgement that involves 
uncertainty. The available information is rarely, if ever, sufficient to actually prove, 
statistically or otherwise, that a given level of welfare is present (Bracke et al., 1999a). 
CSC requires a reasoning process leading to a conclusion (Rushen, 2003). The reason-
ing process may differ in detail, must follow the rules of logic and rational thinking, 
and ideally should result in the most probable and best possible assessment given the 
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present state of the art in science. This is true for a welfare assessment within species, 
but even more so if a comparison is made across species. Although much uncertainty 
remains, some cases involving CSC nevertheless seem to be clear enough to conclude 
that in principle CSC is possible. For example, a starving rat almost certainly is expe-
riencing more hunger than a well-fed dog. Similarly, few scientists would deny that 
tethering systems for individually confined pregnant sows are worse for welfare than 
keeping herds of cattle in semi-natural enclosures. Most humans are not only (widely 
believed to be) more intelligent, but their welfare status too is better than that of most 
farmed domestic fowl. Conversely, some human suffering is substantial and would 
seem to factually outweigh certain types of animal suffering, thereby providing a 
prima facie ethical justification for animal experimentation to the scientists performing 
the experiments. These clear cases suggest that CSC is within the scientific domain 
and also that CSC is in principle possible from a scientific point of view. So the chal-
lenge for a methodology to perform CSC in less clear cases is to reduce the degree 
of uncertainty by providing (at the explanatory and operational levels) empirical data, 
decision rules and a conceptual framework to make the entire reasoning process, i.e., 
all steps between premises and conclusion, more reliable and transparent. As long as 
the considerations underlying the assessment remain implicit, the judgement can-
not be distinguished from anthropomorphic, ‘emotional’ and subjective judgements. 
But, if the reasoning steps are made explicit and if uncertainties are exposed to critical 
evaluation, the role of the evaluating subject is reduced and apparent personal judge-
ments can become intersubjective, even ‘objective’ in the end. When science has es-
tablished such an objective methodology to assess the welfare status of animals within 
and between different species as a factual issue, decision makers can then use the 
results of such factual welfare assessment as input in the ethical and political process 
of deciding what levels of welfare are acceptable, both individually and for society as a 
whole.
Explanatory level
At the explanatory level a comparison of welfare across species must have an expla-
nation within some conceptual framework where it plays a functional role. Gosling 
(2001) provides the following illustration. 
 ‘I tell you a black mamba is trapped in the room next door, and you ask me whether 
it is aggressive. If I adopt a within-species framework, I may respond, “No, it is very unag-
gressive,” because it has attacked only two persons in the last hour, well below the norm for 
this species of snake. If on the other hand, I adopt a cross-species framework, I may respond, 
“Yes, of course it’s aggressive,” because it is a black mamba, a highly aggressive species of 
snake. Thus, the framework I adopt will determine whether I answer yes or no to your ques-
tion about the black mamba’s level of aggression.’ (Gosling, 2001; pp. 58–59). Adopting a 
CSC framework ‘works’ in daily life as well as in science. 
 In biology the law of parsimony is respected. It states that the simplest explana-
tions are to be preferred (Martin & Bateson, 1990). It has, for example, been used to 
deny that animals have feelings and emotions (e.g. Kennedy, 1992). However, when it 
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is accepted that animals have a welfare state, as is done in this paper, then the law of 
parsimony requires that similar welfare measurements in different species should be 
interpreted similarly, unless there are good (empirical) reasons to do otherwise. So as 
a formal requirement the law of parsimony supports CSC.
 Further support for CSC derives from the Darwinian idea that species have evolved 
from common ancestors, as evidenced not only by anatomical and embryological char-
acteristics (e.g. Slack, 2000) but also by behavioural and stress-physiological response 
patterns (e.g. Denver, 1997; Conlon, 2000). Several causal models of behaviour and 
stress have been proposed that apply across species (Bakker & Main, 1980; Ng, 1995). 
In the field of farm animal welfare assessment a common conceptual framework 
among welfare scientists has been formulated (Anon., 2001a). In this paper I shall 
illustrate the complexities involved in CSC in relation to a simplified version of that 
framework, the Istwert–Sollwert (I–S) model of motivation (Wiepkema, 1987).
 In the course of evolution, animals have acquired cognitive-emotional systems 
– which I shall refer to as ‘needs’ – to deal with (predict and control) variable circum-
stances. According to the I–S model, welfare problems arise when animals fail to 
adapt, i.e., when they structurally fail to match the actual state of their environment 
(as they perceived it, ‘Istwert’) with the desired state (‘Sollwert’) using their behav-
ioural or physiological responses. Istwert-perceptions depend on the animals’ sensory 
system. Sollwerte are the result of both the (ontogenetic) life history of the animals, 
but especially also of the (phylogenetic) evolutionary history of the species in its eco-
logical niche, its environment of evolutionary adaptation. In order to assess the welfare 
status of a herd of farm animals of the same species and age group we must somehow 
totalize (add up, integrate) the amount of satisfaction and frustration of all the differ-
ent needs, where the ‘amount’ is a function of the intensity, duration and incidence of 
the need states of the animals in the group. 
 Compared with an assessment of welfare of animals of the same species in differ-
ent housing systems, an assessment across species poses some additional, but at the 
theoretical level not insurmountable complications. A CSC must take into account that 
animals of different species may be exposed to different environmental stimuli. They 
may have different sensory and cognitive systems (and concomitant different Istwert-
perceptions), have different Sollwerte and show different behavioural and physiologi-
cal responses as a result of the different phylogenetic and ontogenetic backgrounds. 
For example, the different evolutionary histories between specialist and generalist 
species have resulted in differences in the degree to which they perceive and respond 
to challenges.
 Cross-species comparisons can be performed if apparent differences can be re-
duced to underlying functional commonalties. Emotions have been linked to only a 
few brain structures (the ‘limbic system’) that show certain similarities between in-
dividuals and species (Panksepp, 1998), but the way the emotions are triggered and 
translated into behavioural and physiological responses may differ widely between 
individuals and species. For example, although a bird may fly, a fish swim and a deer 
run from danger, these different behaviours may serve the same function, i.e., escap-
ing from danger (Plutchik, 1980). Similarly, food acquisition in pigs involves rooting, 
in poultry it involves scratching and pecking, and in cattle grazing and rumination. 
Cross-species comparisons of animal welfare
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Even though these behaviours differ qualitatively from one another, the degree to 
which species-specific foraging behaviours can be performed can be assessed if the 
environmental conditions are known. A dairy cow at pasture is able to perform for-
aging behaviour whereas a pig housed on a concrete floor and a hen in a battery cage 
are not. The importance of performing a certain type of behaviour depends on the 
(biological significance of the) behavioural and physiological consequences. Grazing 
is less important for cattle than rooting is for pigs when – other things being equal 
– thwarted pigs develop abnormal oral behaviours, whereas cattle do not. On the 
other hand, ruminating is more important for cattle than rooting is for pigs since the 
inability to ruminate is life-threatening for cattle whereas such risks are not involved 
for pigs. It is this kind of reasoning that allows drawing conclusions about the impor-
tance of environmental conditions. Individual housing may be as important for a soli-
tary species as group housing is for a gregarious species when similar consequences 
of ‘deprivation’ are observed. The same concrete floor may pose a different problem 
for pigs (inability to root, leading to tail biting) than for cattle (uncomfortable resting, 
leading to lameness).
 In all these cases it is the animal’s (welfare) performance in terms of its behaviour-
al and physiological responses, that ultimately reflects its level of welfare. 
 To study treatment effects, applied ethologists normally use groups of animals of 
the same species, keeping experimental conditions as constant as possible. Normally 
recognized variables include environmental conditions such as climate and feed, and 
animal-based conditions such as weight, sex and age. However, some of these within-
species variables, e.g. those between different age-groups, certain breeds of poultry 
(broilers versus laying hens), may be larger than some between-species variables such 
as between horses and donkeys, between certain breeds of domestic fowl and quail, or 
between cattle and buffalo. For example, Duncan (1979) found profound differences 
between a ‘flighty’ and a ‘docile’ strain of hens. The ‘flighty’ hens showed extreme 
panic and a brief elevated heart rate to visual stimulation, whereas ‘docile’ strains 
showed less extreme behaviour but a prolonged heart-rate elevation. In addition, Korte 
et al. (1997) and Van Hierden et al. (2002) found substantial behavioural and stress-
physiological differences among different lines of White Leghorns, with a high and 
low propensity to perform feather pecking. If such comparisons are allowed, it seems 
arbitrary not to allow at least some types of cross-species comparisons.
 In applied ethology, frequencies and time budgets e.g. of alarm responses and 
agonistic interactions in a group of animals of the same species are commonly used as 
welfare measures. It seems to be assumed that the intensities of the measures co-vary 
with the frequencies and that each incidence counts for one regardless of the distri-
bution over the animals in the group. For example, n = 5 bites, regardless of whether 
one animal is bitten 5 times or 5 animals are bitten once. If such assumptions are 
warrant-ed within species, for practical reasons or otherwise, similar assumptions can 
be formulated for making comparisons across species. If the results are interpreted 
within a biological framework, the most common welfare-related measures such as 
preference tests, measures of cortisol and heart rate variability, human-approach fear 
tests, novel object tests, fear-potentiated startle tests (e.g. Davis et al., 1993), elevated 
plus maze tests, novel environment tests and open field tests can be used to make 
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comparisons across species. The point here is that at the explanatory level and despite 
all remain-ing uncertainties, the facts about the biology of different animal species can 
also be interpreted in a biological framework such as the Istwert–Sollwert model so as 
to make CSC about animal welfare explicit and transparent.
Operational level
At the operational level the question arises as to how to assess welfare in different 
species.
 A statement such as ‘wild animals differ in many respects from domesticated spe-
cies’ (Deag, 1996) suggests that in some cases comparisons across species are already 
operational. One such difference concerns a reduction in brain weight (Herre & 
Röhrs, 1990). Operationalization involves making valid interpretations of selected wel-
fare measures. Ideally, these welfare measures should apply across species and allow 
unambiguous welfare interpretations. Welfare measures that differ across species may 
be used provided they allow a common interpretation. For example, the wallowing of 
the pig and the moistening of the rat’s fur could both indicate a certain level of overhe-
ating. In such cases we look for the common denominator, like rooting in pigs 
and scratching in poultry both being referred to as ‘foraging behaviour’, and tongue-
rolling in veal calves and stereotypic pacing in broiler breeders both being referred to 
as ‘abnormal behaviour’.  
 If common denominators are used, ‘species’ may become a factor, an indepen-
dent variable in the design of a study. Such analyses have already been reported, be it 
sporadically. Bashaw et al. (2001) showed that sub-species was a factor in explaining 
variation in stereotypic behaviour in different ungulates (see also Leenaars et al., 1998 
and Marx et al., 1999). In fields like animal cognition and (psycho)medical research 
CSCs are more common. Laboratory-animal models are being used to extrapolate find-
ings to human beings (e.g. Ford & Hornby, 1996; Smith et al., 2001). In the field of 
psychopharmacology, animal models are being used to test psychoactive drugs such as 
anti-depressants and anxiolytic drugs. Such comparisons are based on similarities in 
neurophysiological architecture (homology between species). Operationally such extra-
polations often work and they presuppose CSC.
 In literature occasionally statements can be found that presume CSC on animal 
welfare. Cross-species comparisons are sometimes made in terms of a trait common 
to both species; for example, firemouth fish are more fearful than goldfish (Shaklee, 
1963), and lion-tailed macaques are more curious than cynomolgus macaques (Clarke 
& Lindburg, 1993). Other cross-species comparisons concern the existence or non-
existence of a trait in different species; for example, a dimension of curiosity appears 
to be present in meerkats but absent in Cuban ground iguanas (Glickman & Sroges, 
1966).’ (Gosling, 2001; p. 58). Morton & Griffith (1985) published a paper on the 
assessment of ‘pain, distress and discomfort’ in different species of (laboratory) ani-
mals. Stern (2001; p. 99) compared the behaviour of domestic fowl, turkeys, ducks 
and geese, and identified differences in various needs. These included the need for 
food (geese are more ‘vegetarian’), the need for water (to swim in), movement, safety 
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(the need for cover), thermal comfort, social contact, the need for nesting (broodiness). 
Bartussek (1986) designed a welfare index that applied to several species of farm ani-
mals such as cattle, pigs, poultry and rabbits. In some studies CSCs are being made, 
e.g. comparing different euthanasia methods (Lambooy, 1985; Iwarsson & Rehbinder, 
1993) and comparing Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal (HPS) Axis responsiveness in 
different species of cats (Carlstead et al., 1992). Muenker et al. (2000) studied the sen-
sitiveness of sea fish on being hauled on board and found that ‘among demersal fishes 
the species without swimbladder and flat fishes were clearly more resistant to mechan-
ical stress. On the contrary, pelagic fish species were generally less robust.’ Such 
differences in physical damage and mortality rates are reliable indicators of reduced 
welfare in these different species of fish. These examples show that in some respects 
relevant to welfare assessment CSCs have already been performed at the operational 
level. To our knowledge no experiments have been performed that directly compared 
the welfare of different farm animals. To support decision-making in this area, the 
challenge remains to design studies like comparing the behaviour and (stress) 
physiology of laying hens and minks in standard and in enriched cages, and more 
generally, comparing the welfare status of different species of farm animals for the 
purpose of labeling for animal welfare.
An example of cross-species comparison
In a relatively recent paper (Anon., 2001a), scientists formulated a common concep-
tual framework for overall welfare assessment by ranking design criteria, performance 
criteria and the main housing systems for different species and age groups of farm 
animals. In this paper (Anon., 2001a) the question remained whether it were possible 
to take such prioritization one step further, i.e., across species. Here the outline of 
a methodology will be presented by way of a tentative example illustrating how CSC 
could be performed in a transparent and systematic way. In this example four livestock 
production systems for three different species of farm animals are compared: (1) bat-
tery cages for laying hens, (2) conventional housing for fattening pigs, (3) conventional 
housing for broilers, and (4) dairy cattle at pasture. If one seriously wonders what 
would be the welfare states of the animals in the different systems, then one realizes 
that the factor ‘species’ appears to be just an additional factor in an already rather 
complex task. Note that layers and broilers belong to the same species, but this does 
not seem to make the comparison substantially more feasible in this pair of systems 
compared with the other pairs. In fact the differences between different types of ani-
mals belonging to one species but housed in different systems, such as layers in cages 
versus conventionally housed biologically farmed broilers, appear to be larger than 
the differences between different species in similar systems such as cows and sows 
grazing on pasture. The outlines of the welfare assessment task within one category 
of animals (pregnant sows) have been described and operationalized (Bracke et al., 
2002a). Welfare assessment requires an assessment of the different welfare needs of 
the animals (needs derived from Bracke et al., 1999b). For each need, each production 
system may be ranked relative to the other systems and weighted, e.g. on a 4-point 
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scale from 1 (need state probably considerably frustrated) to 4 (need state probably 
satisfied). 
 The results of this evaluation process are presented in Table 1. In this table the 
four housing systems (layers in cages, fattening pigs, broilers and dairy cattle at pas-
ture) have been scored for each of 18 needs, wherever this was applicable. Table 1 
does not pretend to be factually correct. It is intended to illustrate how CSC could be 
performed. The table is based on the subjective opinions of the author of this paper. 
However, it is possible to make these opinions explicit, to identify scientific facts 
underlying these opinions and to make the reasoning process transparent and verifia-
ble. For each (welfare) need Table 1 gives an assessment in terms of the expected dis-
crepancy between the animal’s provisions (Istwerte) and its setpoints (Sollwerte). The 
Sollwerte are derived from the animal’s natural behaviour (e.g. social animals have 
a natural tendency to live in social groups), from its ‘demands’ and from knowledge 
about negative welfare symptoms (such as frustration, aggression, stress, abnormal 
behaviour, reduced fitness). The production systems (e.g. battery cages in the case 
of the laying hens) define the Istwerte. The rank numbers in the table are intended 
to represent the animal’s comparisons of Istwerte and Sollwerte. It is presumed that 
the degree of mismatch, i.e., the degree to which each need is satisfied or frustrated, 
is related to the intensity, duration and incidence of the various positive and negative 
welfare performance criteria. Clearly, such an assessment cannot be performed with-
out data from empirical research providing both accurate descriptions of the produc-
tion systems as well as information about the welfare (performance) consequences of 
keeping animals in these systems (compared with keeping them in more natural or 
otherwise welfare-friendly conditions).
 For example, the need for food is considered to be adequately satisfied in each 
of the four production systems (ranking = 4), whereas the satisfaction of the need to 
forage is assessed as 1, 2, 3 and 3.5 for hens, pigs, broilers and cows, respectively. It is 
based on the considerations about the ability to perform foraging behaviour (depend-
ing on space, floor type and the presence of substrates) and the known relationship 
with abnormal behaviours (such as feather pecking and tail biting). The ranking may 
be disputed, however, and further development of the method of CSC should include 
specifying the arguments used to assign the rank-numbers in a more detailed and 
methodic way. For example, the assessment of the need for safety (fear) may use the 
following empirical observation: when the farmer enters the barn in a standardized 
way, different farm animals respond differently. Laying hens and broilers may show 
hysteria, pile up in panic while killing the birds underneath. Fattening pigs may jump 
to their feet, briefly give alarm vocalizations and then show inquisitive behaviour. 
Fattening bulls may hardly respond. From a biological perspective these behavioural 
differences probably represent different fear levels in the different species in response 
to the same stimulus (e.g. a fox is a threat to poultry, but not to cattle). This empirical 
knowledge is relevant to assess the animals’ perception of safety, but other informa-
tion must be taken into account in order to determine the biological significance of 
the phenomena. For example, the lack of overt responding in bulls must be regarded 
as indifferent behaviour rather than freezing. Conversely, because hens are lighter 
and have wings, it may be expected that a pile of hysteric bulls would be experiencing 
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more fear than a similar pile of hens. An assessment of the actual level of distress 
must also take into account differences in external stimulation. Farmers may enter 
buildings in different ways, e.g. farmers often knock on the door before entering a 
poultry barn, and aversive stimuli may not only come from humans e.g. in the form 
of veterinary treatments, but also from conspecifics in the form of aggression. This 
makes the assessment of a welfare need such as safety a rather complex task. It is even 
further complicated by the fact that in addition to the need for safety an overall welfare 
assessment requires assessing other needs as well as a procedure to integrate these 
need states into an overall judgement, prioritization or score. On the other hand, the 
impact of small assessment errors on the overall scores may be relatively small, e.g. 
when small errors randomly vary around the mean. In this paper the assumption for 
integrating different needs into an overall score is that each need is equally important 
(see Bracke et al., 2002a for an alternative weighting method). With that assumption 
the means of the rankings and the Wilcoxon’s signed ranks test may be used to 
examine the relative ‘amounts’ of need frustration in each of the four livestock produc-
tion systems. The mean scores are 2.16 (n = 16), 2.43 (n = 15), 2.63 (n = 15) and 3.19 
(n = 16) for hens, pigs, broilers and cows, respectively. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
shows that cows at pasture are judged to differ significantly (P < 0.05) from each of 
the three other systems, whereas these other systems do not differ significantly from 
one another (P > 0.05).
 The example shows how, at least in clear cases such as the comparison between 
battery hens and cows at pasture, comparisons across species may be performed by 
a scientist in a methodic way using empirical information, a list of needs and an 
assumption about the integration of rankings. In this example different need sta-
tes were used as the common denominators for CSC, but it should be realized that 
selecting a different list of needs or a differential weighting of the different needs may 
alter the outcome. Realize also that a critical re-evaluation of each system’s rank scores 
may result in minor modifications, but this will probably not lead to a very different 
overall ranking of the systems for two reasons. Firstly, dairy cattle repeatedly scored 
better than laying hens as illustrated with the Wilcoxon statistic and, secondly, the 
dairy cattle have been scored somewhat conservatively, e.g. cattle with outdoor access 
on pasture and being milked twice daily could be argued to have considerably more 
opportunities to explore novelty than broilers, pigs or layers in cages. The challenge 
for more empirically-oriented applied ethologists is to design measurable and validat-
ed parameters that apply across species and have a clear welfare interpretation. The 
challenge for ethicists and political scientists is to incorporate the outcomes of such 
assessments into decision-making. For example, a broiler farm will comprise many 
more animals than a herd of cattle. One may legitimately ask whether ethically and/or 
politically a cow, a broiler chicken and a human being are to be counted equally. In 
many other respects more work needs to be done such that CSC in the end involves 
impartial (factual) judgements made in a procedural way based on a thorough knowl-
edge of the facts. The development of a methodology for CSC would not only help 
resolve some actual decision-making issues, it could also help making more explicit 
the assumptions implicit in applied ethology.
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Conclusions
Cross-species comparisons (CSC) are becoming increasingly important in political and 
public decision-making and may pose intriguing challenges to applied ethologists. A 
compilation of philosophical, ethical, political and scientific arguments leads to the 
conclusion that in principle a scientific basis for CSC can be constructed. However, 
at present only widely different housing systems can be distinguished as was shown 
by way of an example comparing laying hens in cages, fattening pigs and broilers in 
conventional housing, and dairy cattle at pasture. There are good prospects for further 
improvements of the method used to make this CSC. This could lead to increasing 
detection levels based on scientific argumentation and the input of factual knowledge.
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